Preferences and Well-Being
Serena Olsaretti
Preferences are often thought to be relevant for well-being: respecting preferences, or satisfying them, contributes in some way to making people's lives go well for them. A crucial assumption that accompanies this conviction is that there is a normative standard that allows us to discriminate between preferences that do, and those that do not, contribute to well-being. The papers collected in this volume, written by moral philosophers and philosophers of economics, explore a number of central issues concerning the formulation of such a normative standard. They examine what a defensible account of how preferences should be formed for them to contribute to well-being should look like; whether preferences are subject to requirements of rationality and what reasons we have to prefer certain things over others; and what the significance is, if any, of preferences that are arational or not conducive to well-being.
Jilid:
59
Tahun:
2006
Edisi:
1
Penerbit:
Cambridge University Press
Bahasa:
english
Halaman:
279
ISBN 10:
0521695589
ISBN 13:
9780521695589
Nama siri:
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements
Fail:
PDF, 1.35 MB
IPFS:
,
english, 2006